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We study different dynamic Stackelberg solutions within a pollution control
problem framework. This study is made under the assumption of different infor-
mation structures, mainly we assume open-loop, feedback and closed-loop struc-
tures of information. Some of the numerical results may appear counterintuitive.
Hence, there exists some situations where the time consistent solution is optimal
in comparison of the time inconsistent one. Moreover, the perfect discretionary
solution is advantageousfor everyone then to stay committed to the initial one.
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1 Introduction
When a ﬁrm polluteswhileproducing,thisﬂowofpollutionwillnegativelyaffect other
economic agents. If the ﬁrm is not liable to directly compensate these agents for the
nuisances it causes, the production and the associated pollution levels optimal for the
ﬁrm will not be optimal for society as a whole. One of the main problems in environ-
mental economics is to ﬁnd ways for a regulator to force such a ﬁrm to make socially
optimal decisions, for example, through a proper use of taxes.
The problem has been extensively treated for the static case (see for example [10]).
However, regulatory taxes have both short and long term consequences on the social
welfare and on the ﬁrm’s behavior. Taking these properly into account makes an ex-
plicitlydynamicanalysisimperative. AsnotedbyBatabyal[5], among others,anatural
way to conduct such an analysis is to model the interaction between the regulator and
The paper was writing when the author was visiting scholar at the Decision and Control Laboratory,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaignand has beneﬁted of helpfultechnical comments made by Prof.
Tamer Ba¸ sar.
yLEN-C3E, Economics Department, University of Nantes, France. vallee@sc-eco.univ-nantes.fr
1the ﬁrm as a dynamic Stackelberg game with the regulator as the leader.
Depending on the information structure many dynamic Stackelberg solutions do
exist. In this paper, using a discrete time dynamic model of pollution control, we de-
rive three of them, thatis the open-loop,feedback and global(closed-loop)Stackelberg
solutions and compare them. As simple as may seem the model, the derivation of the
different dynamic Stackelberg solutionsare not straightforward.
Itiswell-know,since the seminal worksofKydlandandPrescott [8], andBarro and
Gordon [2, 3], that open-loop Stackelberg solutions are time inconsistent. From this
literature,twoothersconclusionshave been generallyadmitted. First,thediscretionary
solution is worst for the follower than the open-loop one with commitment. Second,
the time consistent solution is suboptimal. Using numerical simulations, we show that
those two conclusions do not hold.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we deﬁne the pollution
controlmodel. Theninsection3, we derivethedifferentdynamic Stackelbergsolutions
depending on the information’sstructurefacing each player in the followingorder: ﬁrst
the open-loop one, second the feedback one, and third the global Stackelberg solution
(that is a closed-loop structure of information). In section 4, before concluding, using
two numerical simulations, we compare these solutions.
2 The pollution control
2.1 The general model
We consider a discrete time version of the continuous time model of pollution sug-
gested by Batabyal [5]. There are two players: the regulator (the leader, R)a n da
monopolist (the follower, F). The planning horizon is T periods, with T  20.T h e r e
is no discounting. The goal of the monopolistis to maximize its cumulated proﬁts over
the T periods with respect to its choice of output. In each period t, the monopolist’s
revenue is given by P(qt)qt,w h e r eq tis its output in period t,a n dw h e r eP( q t)is the
inverse demand curves it faces.
Following Batabyal [5], the monopolist is facing three kinds of costs associated
with qt. First, a production cost wqt that is assumed to be proportional to the output.
Second, the tax paid to the regulator tqt. And third, a cost c(xt)qt that depends on
the current stock of pollution, xt. This last cost reﬂects the fact that the production
efﬁciency decreases as the environment becomes more polluted. It may be or not inter-
nalized by the ﬁrm.




P(qt)qt − wqt −tqt − c(xt)qt !f q tg t 2 [1;T] max (2.1.1)
2We assume that P
0
(qt) < 0 and P
00
(qt)  0,a n dt h a tc
0
( x t)>0 ,c
00
(xt) < 0 and
c(0) = 0. Furthermore, we assume w>0 .
The regulator attempts to maximize, through its choice of tax rates, its cumulated
payoff. Again, followingBatabyal [5] this payoff depends on three components. First,
a function B(qt) that represents a social beneﬁt when tithe ﬁrm produces at the level
qt. Second, a function D(xt) which measures the damage from pollution. And ﬁnally




B(qt)+ tq t−D ( x t) (2.1.2)
We assume that B(:) and D(:) are respectively at least C2 and C1 functions. Fur-
thermore, [B
0
(qt) > 0, B
00
(qT) < 0, D
0
(xt) > 0 and D
00
(xt) > 0, that is the social
costs of pollution are increasing in the pollution stock at an ever increasing rate. The
strict concavity of B(qt)+ tq tis needed in order to insure the existence and unique-
ness of a solution.
Finally, we suppose that xt evolves according to
xt+1 = f(qt;x t) (2.1.3)
with x1 given, and where f(qt) is a differentiable function, with f
0
(qt) > 0 and
f
00
(qt) > 0.W ea l s oh a v ef
0
( x t )>0and f
00
(xt) > 0. Hence, the pollutionstock in
t +1is increasing in the pollutionstock and in the ﬁrm’s outputin t.
For the purpose of the paper, we more speciﬁcally assume1:
P(qt)  a − bqt; (2.1.4)
c(xt)  xt; (2.1.5)










xt+1  qt + ~ xt: (2.1.8)
where the coefﬁcients a, b, , γ,  and ~  are supposed to be strictly positive and
with <1and ~ <1 . The functional forms, as well as the hypotheses made earlier
on the different derivatives, are standard in economic theory and will not be further
justiﬁed here. The assumption ~ <1captures the fact that there is a natural resorption
of the current pollutionstock, at the rate (1 − ~ ).
We may now derive the different dynamic Stackelberg solutions.
1Some others speciﬁcations are possible, see Batabyal[4, 5]
33 The different solutions
We assume that there is no uncertainty and that the regulator knows perfectly the dif-
ferent parameters of the monopolist’sproﬁts, even his cost. Furthermore, the regulator,
our leader, is strongenoughtoforce the monopoletotake as giventhe level oftaxation.
3.1 The open-loop Stackelbergsolution
This solution was ﬁrst introduced by Simaan and Cruz [12, 11] (for a more detail on
it, see Ba¸ sar and Olsder [1]). To achieve the solution, the followingsteps are required.
First, for any ﬁxed action of the leader t, the reaction function of the follower is
derived by maximizing the ﬁrm’s payoff under the state constraint (2.1.3). Then, inte-
grating this reaction function into the leader’s payoff and minimizing again under the
state constraint, gives the optimal action of the leader which induces an optimal action
for the follower. As noticed by Simaan and Cruz [11], latter by Kydland [7] and popu-
larized by Kydland and Prescott [8], this solutionis time inconsistent.





(a − bqt)qt − wqt −tqt − xtqt (3.1.1)
subject to
xt+1 =qt + ~ xt (3.1.2)
Deﬁne the ﬁrm’s Hamiltonian as HF(qt;x t;p F
t+1)  JF
t +pF
t+1(qt+ ~ xt).T h e n
using the ﬁrst order conditions for a maximization of this Hamiltonian, one may get
after some algebras
q =





(a − w − t − xt +pF
t+1)
2b
+ ~ xt (3.1.4)
pF
t+1 =







with initial and ﬁnal condition pF
T+1 =0and x1 given. The stock of pollution at
the period T +1 ,x T+1 is free. One reason to let it free is that the regulator may not
know what is or not an acceptable ﬁnal level of pollution.
Thisabove setofequationsdeﬁnesthereactionfunctionofthemonopole(follower)
to any announced tax path. Integration of (3.1.3) into JL
t , we may solve the regulator’s

































Then we know from Ba¸ sar and Olsder [1] that the open-loop Stackelberg solution


















(a − w − t − xt + pF
t+1)
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t+1(2b~  − ) −(γ + t)+ 2 t
2 b
+
































with x0 given, and 1 =0 (3.1.12)
The boundary condition 1 =0is directly related to pF
T+1 =0 .F u r t h e r m o r e ,w e
have pR
T+1 =0 . As known, the open-loop Stackelberg solution is time inconsistent,
since a reoptimization latter in time, at period k for example, will give again to set
k =0although initiallycalculated, at period 1,w eh a v e k6 =0 .
5Anyway,theseabove necessary conditions,aftersome algebrasandfollowingMedanic
[9] give us to solve an augmented discrete Hamiltonian matrix (i.e. with a tracking ma-



















Where A, B, C are some 2  2 matrices, D is a 2  1 matrix and ~ xt and ~ pt are





































































To solve this tracking problem deﬁned above we use the sweep method (see Bryson
and Ho [6]). That is, we assume a linear relation between the costate and the state
vectors:
~ pk = Sk~ xk − gk (3.1.14)
Thus, using this into the augmented Hamiltonian matrix we ﬁrst get an expression for
xk+1:
~ xk+1 =( I 2  2−BSk+1)−1(A~ xk − Bgk+1 + D) (3.1.15)
Then using (3.1.15) and (3.1.14) into the deﬁnitionof pk+1 as given by the augmented
Hamiltonian matrix, and equating both sides we ﬁnally get the difference equations:
Sk = C + ASk+1(I22 − BSk+1)−1A; (3.1.16)
gk = ASk+1(I22 − BSk+1)−1(Bgk+1 − D)+Agk+1 − E; (3.1.17)
where the ﬁrst equation is the so-called Riccati difference equation, and the second one














ST+1 =0 2  2;and gT+1 =0 2  1: (3.1.19)
From the boundary conditions we get
ST = C; and ;g T =E: (3.1.20)
and so on. Once, the computation off line, backward in time, of the different values of
Sk and gk are made, the values of ~ xt and ~ pt follows. From them we get the values of
xt, t, pR
t and pF
t ,f o ra l lt2[1;T]. The optimal open-loop Stackelberg actions are
directly given after by (3.1.7) and (3.1.3).
3.1.2 The optimal discretionary open-loop Stackelberg solution
As we said, the open-loop Stackelberg solution is time inconsistent. That is, for any
announced sequence of taxation f
t gt2[1;T] made at time t =1 , it will not be optimal
to continue with this sequence at time t =2 . But rather, the regulator may solve the
problem starting at time t =2and ﬁnishing at t = T in order to ﬁnd a new announced
sequence of taxation f
t gt2[2;T]. But again, this new sequence will be suboptimal at
t =3 . And so on untilt = T.
Let f
t gi be the optimal open-loop sequence of taxation for the problem start-
ing at time t = i and ﬁnishing at time t = T.D e ﬁ n e f  
t g 1
ias the ﬁrst com-
ponent of this sequence (and also unique one for the case where i = T). Then,











In the economic literature, such a discretionary policy is generally assumed to be
worst for the follower regardless to the committed strategy that is f
t g1. As we will
see this is not the case. Both players, monopolist and regulator, may gain by using
such a discretionary policy. Then the monopole may rationally accept to believe in a
sequence of taxation even if he knows that this sequence will be revised tomorrow.
3.2 The feedback solution
To solve the game, under the feedback structure of informationassumption, we use the
dynamic programming method with appropriate value functions(see Ba¸ sar and Olsder
for more details [1]). Recall that this solution is time consistent by construction.
7Let T be the last period of the problem. Then the level of pollution xT+1 doesn’t
mindanymore, since itslevel isfree. The reactionfunctionofthemonopolistisdirectly
given by: "argmaxqT2< JF
T ". That is:
q
T =
a − w − T − xT
2b
(3.2.1)






T −D( x T) (3.2.2)
where q
T is given by (3.2.1). The maximum is obtained when

T =
(1 + 2b)(a − w − xt) −2bγ
1+4 b
(3.2.3)
Aftersome algebras we get, forthelastperiod,some speciﬁc deﬁnitionsforthe actions,
state and cost functions. Those deﬁnitions are generalized by resolving the problem at
the period T − 1. The value functions for the period T − 1 to T are deﬁned by













Using the deﬁnition xT = qT−1 + ~ xT−1 into JF
T and maximize the value func-
tion for any ﬁxed T−1 gives an optimal action for the monopole for the period T − 1.
Integrating this into the value function of the regulator, using again the state equation
deﬁnition and maximizing over all possible T−1, we can write the results in some
general speciﬁc forms :
t = Ktxt + kt; (3.2.6)
qt = ~ Ktxt + ~ kt; (3.2.7)
xt+1 =Ω tx t+ ~ k t; (3.2.8)
JR
t = Ptx2
t + ptxt + nt; (3.2.9)
JF
t = ~ Ptx2
t +~ p tx t+~ n t; (3.2.10)
8for all t 2 [1;T]and with
Kt =
− +2 (  2( P t+1 + ~ Pt+1) − b)+2 ~ (~ P t+1 − 2b(Pt+1 − ~ Pt+1) − 22 ~ P 2
t+1)




−a − 2ab+2 bγ +2 bpt+1 +2 a2Pt+1 − ~ pt+1(1 + 2b − 22Pt+1)
−1 − 4b +2  2( P t+1 +2~ P t+1)
+
22 ~ Pt+1(a − γ − w − pt+1 + ~ pt+1)+w−2 bw − 22wPt+1
−1 − 4b +2  2( P t +1 +2~ P t+1
(3.2.12)
~ Kt =
 +2 ~ ( P t +1 + ~ Pt+1)
1+4 b−2  2( P t +1 +2~ P t +1)
; (3.2.13)
~ kt =
a + γ − w + (pt+1 − ~ pt+1)
1+4 b−2  2( P t +1 +2~ P t +1)
; (3.2.14)














+ γ~ kt + kt~ kt; (3.2.18)
~ Pt = −b ~ K2
t −  ~ Kt − Kt ~ Kt; (3.2.19)
~ pt = a ~ Kt − 2b ~ Kt~ kt − w ~ Kt − ~ kt − Kt~ kt − ~ Ktkt; (3.2.20)
~ nt = a~ kt − b~ k2
t − w~ kt − kt~ kt: (3.2.21)
where Kt and ~ KT may be seen as some (1  1) matrices deﬁned by the appropriate














a − w + γ
1+4 b
: (3.2.25)
One must solve off-line the set of equations (3.2.11)-(3.2.21) using the terminal
conditions, and then compute on-line the values of t, qt and xt.
93.3 The global Stackelbergsolution
Here, we assume that the structure of the information is a closed-loop one. That is,
the leader has a perfect knowledge of all the past and current values of the state and
controls. In such an information structure, the regulator may try to ﬁnd an incentive
strategy such that he can reach his global optimum (i.e. optimum optimorum).
This optimum optimorum is assumed to be unique. Then there exists a couple
(q
t;
t), 8t 2 [1;T], such that JR
t is maximized. Generally, following Ba¸ sar and
Olsder [1], this pair of actions is directly given by "max;qJR(q;)". But this is pos-
sible only if JR(q;) is strictly concave in q and  and if there is no singularity. But
JR(q;) is singular in . Then a direct optimizationis not possible.
In order to avoid this singularity,we need to add a constraint on  or q. Obviously,
one should guess that this optimum optimorum will be reach when the proﬁt of the
monopole will be zero (i.e. JF(;q)=0 ).
Recall that JF
t =( a−bqt)qt − tqt − wqt − xtqt. Then to require JF
t =0
involves that either
qt =0 ; or qt =
a − w − xt − t
b
: (3.3.1)
Logically, qt =0is not the good choice and the other one will be chosen.








Then themaximization problemof theregulator,over t and qt,g i v eu st os o l v et h e











= γ −qt +t +pR












= −xt + ~ pR







− qt =0 : (3.3.7)
After some algebras, we get
t =




































with the boundary conditions
pR
T+1 =0 ; and x1 given: (3.3.10)
By assuming a linear relationshipbetween theco-state and the state, pR
t = Ktxt −
gt, we get to solve off-line,backward in time, the scalar Riccati and tracking difference
equations






























) g t +1: (3.3.12)
with the terminal conditions
KT = − +
2b
2b+1
;K T +1 =0 ; (3.3.13)
gT =
b(a− w + γ)
2b +1
;g T +1 =0 : (3.3.14)





t gt=1;:;T and fq
tgt=1;:;T.
Recall that f
t gt=1;:;T and fq
tgt=1;:;T achieve the optimum optimorumof the regula-
tor, under the zero-proﬁt constraint.
The problem facing the regulator is now to ﬁnd an optimal incentive strategy, that
will be announced at the beginning of the game, such that the monopole implements
the sequence fq
tgt=1;:;T. Following Ba¸ sar and Olsder [1], such an incentive strategy,
call it , may be deﬁned as
t  t(qt)= 




t are the desired actions, from the viewpoint of the regulator, and are
some known values. Then we need to ﬁnd fktgt=1;:;T such that the monopole can-
not do better than fq
tgt=1;:;T and such that the regulator will have also to choose
f
t gt=1;:;T. Thus, if such a sequence of incentive strategies exists, the global Stackel-
berg solutionistime consistentbyhypothesissince itreaches theoptimum optimorum.
11Since t(qt) is a knownfunction, the problem facingthe monopole is onlya simple
optimal control problem. As there is no uncertainty, the solution will be the same re-
gardless of what which informationstructure is facing the monopole (i.e. open-loopor
feedback). The solution for simplicity will be given under a feedback assumption for
the monopole.
Let the incentive strategy for the last period be
T = 
T + kT(q
T − qT): (3.3.16)
Then the problem facing the monopole is only: "argmaxqT JF
T (qT; T)". The ﬁrst




T −w − xT
2b −2kT
: (3.3.17)
Recall that we want qT = q
T.L e tk 











We may easily guess the sign of k
T. It should be positivesince the couple (
T;q 
T)
is deﬁned under the non-proﬁt constraint. That is, the monopole, given 
T, should not
be able to produce more (i.e. qT  q
T ) JF
T (
T;q T)<0). Since the monopole may
only decide to produce less, a lower value of qT should be associated to an increase of
the taxation in order to incent the monopole to choose q
T. Then obviously we need to
have k
T > 0.
Furthermore, by using (3.3.18), one can easily check that the best choice for the
monopole is then to implement qT = q
T. Then the payoff of the last period for the










T +~ p Tx T+~ n T; (3.3.19)
where
~ PT =0 ;
~ p T =− q
T;











One may check that T(k
T) also induces the regulator to implement 
T. Assuming
this, we can write the payoff of the regulator as follows
JR
T = PTx2















Followinga similar procedure that we used in order to derive thefeedback solution
(that is by used of the dynamic programming method), we get the general forms
qt =














t + ~ xt; (3.3.23)
JR
t = Ptx2
t + ptxt + nt; (3.3.24)
JF
t = ~ Ptx2















~ Pt =0 ;
~ p t=− q
t;






Remark: it is possible that for some values of the parameters, we have k
t = b for
some t. Then as easily seen from (3.3.17)or (3.3.21), the problemfacing themonopole
becomes singular. In such a case, the optimal level of production may not be obtained















4 Numerical comparisons of the solutions
The results presented here were obtained for the followingvalues of the parameters:
a = 150;b=5 ;w=2 ;=2 ;=3 ;and γ =5 :
13The initial level of pollutionis supposed to be x1 =1 .
We ran twodifferent numerical simulationsdepending on the values of  and ~ .I n
the ﬁrst one, we set  =0 : 4and ~  =0 : 5 ,a n d=0 : 8and ~  =0 : 8forthe second one.
4.1 First case:  =0 : 4and ~  =0 : 5
Logically the best solution,from the regulator viewpoint,is the global one (table 1 and
ﬁgure 1), and it is the worst for the monopolist since its proﬁts reduce to zero (table1
and ﬁgure 2). Thissolutioninvolves thehigher levels ofpollution2, taxand production.
Recall that his global Stackelberg solution is time consistent.
Quite surprising is that the time consistent feedback solution does also better than
the open-loop one, with or without commitment (ﬁgure 1 and table 1). It is generally
assumed that the problem of the time consistent solutionis its suboptimalityin respect
of the discretionary one (cf. Kydland and Prescott [8], Barro and Gordon[2, 3]). What
we learn from this simple model it’s that there is no way it should be always the case




Open-loop (OL) 8:2256 103 3:7337 103
Optimal discretionary (OLd) 8:2363 103 4:1417 103
Feedback (Fd) 8:5344 103 3:9647 103
Closed-loop(CL) 1:3899 104 0
Table 1: Cumulated Payoffs
The level of pollution is directly related to the regulator’s welfare. And since all
others variables are connected each others, we found the same order of the solutions
in the ﬁgures. Hence, higher welfare will imply higher pollution,and so a higher price
and production.
Asthe globalsolutioninvolveszero-proﬁtsforthemonopole, onemay wonderwhy
the monopolewillstillproduce something? Obviously, theregulator may accept some
proﬁt for the monopole by allowing a littlemore pollution. That is our global solution
is based on a non-proﬁtconstraint. All constraints that will involve a level of pollution
between this one and the one obtained under the feedback solution will still allow the
global Stackelberg solutionto be the ﬁrst one.































The twotime consistentsolutionsmainly differ because of thelevel of taxation, this
level is higher with the incentive solution(global Stackelberg) since the proﬁt must be
reduce to zero.
Another important conclusion is that, in an open-loop information structure, the
discretionary solution is better for everyone than to stay committed to the initial an-
nouncement (ﬁgures 1 and 2 and table 1). In such a case, we don’t see any reason why
this discretionary solution should involve some loss of credibility,since the monopole
may be aware that to believe in a likely recalculated sequence of taxations will get him
in a better positionafter. Then he may optimallybelieve an initialsequence of taxation
knowing that the regulator will not continuewith it latter.
4.2 Second case:  =0 : 8and ~  =0 : 8
The simulation provides the same kinds of comments. That is, and the more important
one, the monopolist will beneﬁt from a not-committed regulator’s policy to the open-
loop initialsolution(table 2 and ﬁgure 4).
For the regulator, the feedback time consistent solution is no more better than the
optimaldiscretionaryone (ﬁgure3and table2). Butthese solutionsare veryclosed. Fi-
nally, itseems thatthegain fromnot stayingcommitted toan initialopen-loopsolution
(by usingthe optimal discretionarysolution)is always quitesmall. So, the incentiveto
deviate is not very strong (tables 1 and 2).
5 Conclusion
Inthispaper, wederivedthedifferentpossibleStackelbergsolutionsofa leader-follower
pollutiongame. The different solutionsare well-known,mainly because of the work of
Ba¸ sar and Olsder [1]. But despitethis fact, some misunderstandingsstillexist concern-




Open-loop (OL) 3:2652 103 1:0727 103
Optimal discretionary (OLd) 3:2725 103 1:2848 103
Feedback (Fd) 3:1988 103 1:3525 103
Closed-loop(CL) 4:1890 103 0



































the suboptimality of the time consistent solution, and the assuming increased cost on
the follower when the leader use a discretionary policy.
Hence, with one particular numerical simulation we presented, we found that the
time consistent solution is the best one for the leader. Moreover, it is possible to ﬁnd a
simulationsuch as thisconclusionalso holdsforthefollower. The gainforbothplayers
of using optimaldiscretionary solutionwas underlined. This result is closely related to
the fact that a cheating-by-second play strategy may also be a good strategy for both
players (see Vallée, Deissenberg and Ba¸ sar [13]). Finally, we concluded on the very
small advantage of using such a solution.
Of course, those results were found with a very speciﬁc dynamic game model.
Another one may give opposite results. Some more theoretical understandings of the
different dynamic solutionsare needed if we want, for example, to know exactly when
and why a time consistent solution may be suboptimal or not. Such a project is a
currently research.
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17A Graphics
We use the followingabbreviations and notations for the graphics:
 ol (—) Open-loop solution,
 old (o) Open-loop discretionary solution,
 fd (+) Feedback solution,
 cl (- -) Closed-loopsolution(myopic and nonmyopic cases),




























































Figure 8: Production’s level
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Figure 12: Production’slevel
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